ABSTRACT Privacy in social networks is a large and growing concern in recent times. It refers to various issues in a social network which include privacy of users, links, and their attributes. Each privacy component of a social network is vast and consists of various sub-problems. For example, user privacy includes multiple sub-problems like user location privacy, and user personal information privacy. This survey on privacy in social networks is intended to serve as an initial introduction and starting step to all further researchers. We present various privacy preserving models and methods include naive anonymization, perturbation, or building a complete alternative network. We show the work done by multiple researchers in the past, where social networks are stated as network graphs with users represented as nodes and friendship between users represented as links between the nodes. We study ways and mechanisms developed to protect these nodes and links in the network. We also review other systems proposed, along with all the available databases for future researchers in this area.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks have gained huge popularity in today's world. People tend to use multiple networking sites [7] , [22] , [25] , [27] , [68] , such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. Social networks have become an inevitable part in our daily life. We store information such as date of birth and exact place of ones' location in social media. We store all our personal content online such as contacts, photos, and bookmarks. We also interact with many people through posts, tweets, and tags. Various types of social networks are used in present day, and each one has a unique feature [12] , [26] , [28] .
1) Personal networks. These type of networks focuses on creating the detailed online profile of an individual by including as many user attributes as possible. They also allow users to connect. Websites like Facebook, Friendster, and MySpace are some examples. 2) Status update networks. These type of networks focuses on posting user updates online. These posts include user's interests, places visited and their personal thoughts. Twitter is the best example of this type. 3) Shared-interest networks. These type of networks is designed to get a group of people together with common interests. For example, LinkedIn is a professional network website developed for employers and job seekers. ResearchGate is developed for researchers to broadcast their publications and contact the authors of their papers of interest. 4) Neighborhood Exploring networks. These type of networks is designed to find users in the neighborhood for sharing information, media files, and interaction. These communications may later lead to a personal meeting and hence searching for neighbors depend hugely on location information. Recent development in the technology has made it easier to collect massive amounts of social network data and hence leads to serious privacy concerns. For example, in networks like LinkedIn, an intruder who necessarily is not a friend of a person can also gather information about how he is related to that person. He can collect information on common friends or a link of friends between him and the person he intends to attack. 1) Behavioral advertising is an example of privacy breach. These advertisements are tailored based on person's interest. These kinds of ads are much more profitable in social networks as the probability of a user clicking on these ads are higher than untailored ads. Google, Facebook, Twitter and all major social networking sites provide access to the third party advertising companies. These advertising companies use a variety of data such as the location of the user, relationship status and so on. Even on networks like Facebook, we see advertisements of travel agencies if we change the status to married [33] . Data released is anonymized but sometimes unintentionally leaks some of the user's crucial information. Facebook has exposed six million users' phone numbers and email addresses to unauthorized users for a year [52] . 2) Identity theft uses an individual's personal information often for financial gain. The information posted on users' social network profiles is used to steal their identity. In 2009, researchers at Carnegie Mellon University had found that the data extracted from social networks and other online public databases can lead to the discovery of partial or full social security numbers [72] . 3) Stalking / Child Abuse One of the early privacy cases in this regard occurred in 2010 on MySpace where minors were bullied and led to the adoption of ''age requirements and other safety measures'' [20] . Another crime committed by Peter Chapman in 2009, who falsely obtained an identity of another person on Facebook and lured and raped a 17-year-old girl [53] . Events such as stalking and ''catfishing'' are frequent in present society and hence has become a prominent topic in social network security. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the social network as a graph and discussed necessary conditions for a graph to be secure. Section 3 analyzes the effectiveness of various privacy models proposed for a graph based social network which includes node and link privacy. Section 4 discusses previous attacks known to have violated privacy in social network along with their proposed solutions. Section 5 introduces a new trend in this research, privacy in mobile social networks. Section 6 discusses alternate social networks intended to address various privacy concerns. Section 7 introduces data collection methods and provides a list of available databases. Finally, Section 8 provides a summary of the methods and their usage techniques while section 9 discusses the opportunity for future work.
II. SOCIAL NETWORK AS GRAPH
To address the previously mentioned privacy concerns on social networks, we intend to anonymize users' profiles or anonymize the network. To understand this better, let us reconstruct the social network problem as a graph-based problem. Any social network can be represented as a graph, where each user's profile is a node and friendship between two users is an edge between those two nodes. Figure 1 shows a social network graph with nodes (users) and links between them.
To formally define this, let the social network graph can be expressed as following equation G = (V, E), where V is vertices/users and E is the edges (friendship) between them. By this definition, we have two ways to anonymize the social network graph. We can anonymize either vertices or edges. But the anonymization technique should not remove too much information that we cannot retrieve the original graph. Privacy in any graph data should follow specific rules to maintain anonymity:
A. K-ANONYMITY K-anonymity was well studied by Samarati [47] , Samarati and Sweeney [48] , and Sweeney [54] . According to them, a graph is k-degree anonymous if, for every node v, there exist at least k-1 other nodes in the graph with the same degree as v. This helps to anonymize the graph while preserving its utility. In this method, anonymization is achieved by simply adding the edges to the existing graph. That is, k-anonymity consists of two steps: first constructing new degree sequence, d', that is k-anonymous; secondly, construct a new graph with this new degree sequence. Running time of this method is O(nk). It is also to be observed that no anonymized graph should be of the size larger than 2k-1. According to [48] , k-anonymity method is implemented in the following way. First, we construct a new graph from the obtained new degree sequence by starting with the highest degree vertex. In the subsequent iterations, we always consider the highest remaining degree vertex available for that iteration.
K-anonymity is simple and efficient but suffers from its various drawbacks. One of the significant drawbacks is that it is vulnerable to attribute disclosure. Numerous researchers have worked on this drawback to improvise the algorithm, e.g., [56] , [61] . Two other notable attacks were identified in [38] : homogeneity and the background knowledge attack.
B. L-DIVERSITY
According to [38] , ''An equivalence class is said to have l-diversity if there are at least l ''well-represented'' values for the sensitive attribute.'' In this method, the term VOLUME 6, 2018 ''well-represented'' can be interpreted in many ways. In this paper, authors have used entropy as the information-theoretic notion and hence came the concept of Entropy l-diversity.
Entropy l-Diversity: The entropy of an equivalence class E is defined to be
Where S is the set of sensitive attributes, and p(E,s) is the fraction of records in E that have sensitive value s. If the set S is divided into two sub-blocks S a and S b , then Entropy(S) ≥ min(Entropy(S a ), Entropy(S b )). So, to achieve l-diversity, we need to maintain an entropy of at least log(l) for the entire table. One of the exceptions for this scenario is when the sensitive attribute is very common, and hence this method is restrictive.
While l-diversity is advantageous over k-anonymity, it still has drawbacks. Primarily, this method is complicated and may not be necessary to achieve [36] . Also, l-diversity is not sufficient to ensure the prevention of attribute disclosure. It is prone to skewness and similarity attacks. Authors of citexiao2006 have observed that the l-diversity, improvement over K-anonymity, still cannot restrain attribute disclosure when the table contains multiple records of an individual. They proposed to have each specify privacy policies about his or her attributes.
C. T-CLOSENESS
Although k-anonymity and l-diversity define the necessary conditions for privacy preservation, they are not sufficient. Both these methods suffer from drawbacks. K-Anonymity is vulnerable to attribute disclosure; whereas, l-diversity needs at least 'l' well-represented values for each sensitive attribute. According to [36] , ''l-diversity is neither necessary nor sufficient to prevent attribute disclosure''. Hence, a new technique is proposed in [36] , called ''T-closeness'', to improve the performance by adding a constraint to l-diversity. According to this constraint, it is essential to maintain the distribution of a sensitive attribute comparable to the distribution of its overall table. Specifically, the difference between the distributions in equivalence class and entire table for a given sensitive attribute should not be more than a given threshold. This additional constraint helps in preventing similarity attacks. To calculate the distance, Li et al. [36] have chosen to use the earth mover distance measure.
III. PRIVACY TYPES IN SOCIAL NETWORKS
According to [31] , there are three categories in which the privacy has to be maintained.
• Node Privacy: Information about the user has to be preserved.
• attribute privacy: Information about user attributes like age, sex, interests, location and so on should be preserved.
• Link privacy: Information about the link or friendship between users should be preserved. 
A. NODE PRIVACY
In this kind of anonymization, we aim to anonymize the user in a network which is same as the anonymization of the vertices in a graph. This anonymization can be achieved by a simple technique called Naive anonymization [24] .
In this method, all the vertices are replaced with random numbers or alphabets [45] . Thus, an attacker retrieving a node perceives a number but does not have the referencing physical node information. This method can be visualized as in figure 2 . This kind of anonymization is effortless, but is prone to simple attacks like infiltration, where the intruder extracts the information by adding himself as a friend of certain nodes and retrieve information on all the links that go through these nodes. For example, in networks like Facebook, it is easy to retrieve information of ''Friends of Friends'' if the profiles are made public. This type of crawling may lead to the discovery of complete or partial network and thus leading to the development of the network structure locally [34] . Previous studies have revealed that the background information of an adversary may also lead to the discovery of vertex degrees in a given network [23] , [24] , [37] , [63] , node pair similarities [64] , [65] , and link types [3] , [9] , [13] , [67] . An attack, called the walk-based attack, had been proposed in [35] to understand the connection between any two given nodes. In this method, an attacker creates k different accounts and links them randomly in the network. He then creates a specific link pattern with the nodes of interest. Once the adversary establishes these connections, it is easy to identify the sub-graph of the nodes, in the anonymized graph, that corresponds to his accounts with a high probability.
According to [24] , we measure the following quantities for each edge:
• Closeness Centrality: This is the average shortest path from one node to all the nodes in the graph.
• Betweenness Centrality: This is the proportion of all shortest paths through a given node.
• Path Length Distribution: This is constructed from all the shortest paths between each pair of nodes.
• Degree Distribution: This is the distribution of all the vertices degrees
• Diameter: This is the maximum shortest path between any two given nodes. By preserving the parameters of a node as mentioned earlier, we can ensure the utility of a given graph. Perturbation is one of the common techniques used to add or delete nodes into the graph. But perturbation, if exceeded more than a certain level, can cause randomness and leads to information loss. According to [24] , information loss after a perturbation of 10% is substantial and cannot be recovered. Perturbation can be done in two ways: random and constrained.
Zhou and Jian [69] have enhanced the traditional k-anonymity and l-diversity methods to anonymize the social networks using both node and link perturbations. In the k-anonymity method proposed by [69] , we anonymize the vertices using a technique called ''neighborhood component coding''. In this method, vertices are greedily classified into 'n' similar groups, and the vertices in the same category are replaced with the same label. Following the power law distribution, this method starts off by finding the highest degree vertex. This technique is improvised in [62] which suggests that the graphs should be isomorphic. Similarly, Zhou and Jian [69] have proposed that to achieve l-diversity, we need to divide all the nodes into equivalence groups.
B. LINK PRIVACY
A link in a social network can be presumed as a connection from one user to the other. One of the serious concerns in social network privacy, targeted advertisements, uses sensitive attributes like ones' health information, bank name, country of origin and so on for their data mining. A recent article shows that Facebook provides user categories to thirdparty advertisers [1] . This leak of information may cause the loss of private information. Link privacy can be achieved with a simple technique called ''Edge Perturbation''. References [19] and [18] have initially introduced the concept of ''Edge Perturbation'' in which a query adds Laplacian noise to guarantee k-anonymity. That is, an edge is either removed or added to introduce Laplacian noise to the existing graph. This concept has been further explored in [46] , where the γ value in the Laplacian noise is changed corresponding to the sensitive data in a query. According to [67] , primitive edge anonymization can be achieved in five different ways:
• Intact edges: This technique removes sensitive edges leaving all the other edges intact.
• Partial-edge removal: This technique removes certain percentage of observations based on a pre-specified criterion. For example, removing edges that connects high degree nodes at random.
• Cluster-edge anonymization: In this method, we form clusters of different edge types and make sure the number of edges between these clusters remain same, even after removing and adding random edges.
• Cluster-edge anonymization with constraints: This technique is an extension to the previous technique. Here, we assume additional constraints like any two equivalence classes should have same limitations to the corresponding nodes in the original graph.
• Removed edges: This technique removes all edges. Although there are five different ways to anonymize a graph, it is imminent that the privacy increases with the amount of anonymization, but the utility decreases. Mittal et al. [41] have proposed an extension to the simple perturbation by the use of random walks. A random walk, as the name suggests, is to start off with an arbitrary vertex in a graph as the source and move to its random neighbor until the desired path length is achieved. Let us assume that we have randomly selected vertex 'u' as the source node. Then, out of all the neighbors of vertex 'u', one neighbor is selected to continue the walk, say 'v', and parallelly we increment the path length by '1'. We continue the process of random walk till the desired length 'l' is obtained. However, this technique can be compromised by simple perturbation attacks. According to [41] , a simple perturbation to random walk technique is to introduce a new edge at the end of the existing path with a length 'l-1'. Let us assume that there is a path 'a-b-c-d', then the perturbation of node 'z' is done by adding it to the path 'a-b-c-d-z'. In this case, we face two problems:
• Random walk path could be completed at node 'd' or • Node 'z' is already on the path To eliminate both the problems which might lead to selfloops or duplicate edges, we perform the random walk process until a suitable path is found. To maintain the utility of the graph, an application parameter l is maintained. This parameter can be used to control random walk (l-hop random walk).
IV. KNOWN ATTACKS WITH PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
There are some known attacks in the past on social/graph data. They are presented below along with the proposed solutions.
A. SYBIL ATTACK
If a node or an entity is presenting multiple identities, it is called a Sybil node. An attack where an attacker forges various identities on some nodes is called a Sybil attack. It was first developed at Microsoft Research in 2002 [16] . It is proven that the Sybil attacks can even compromise the initial generation of identities and hence can endanger the whole network. This can just be prevented by having a centralized server. But having centralized server attracts other kinds of attacks which are relatively harder to deal with. So, we need to come up with technologies to prevent or reduce Sybil attacks in a decentralized environment. SybilInfer and SybilLimit are two such techniques in social networks. Their underlying assumption is that the social network is fast mixing.
• SybilLimit This is a decentralized approach to restrict the Sybil nodes to a certain number. Yu et al. [66] have proven that the sybilLimit technique is designed in such a way that the accepted number of Sybil nodes per attack edge is not higher than log n. In this method, each node will have a public/private key pair and an edge key between any two nodes. Also, every node will have a pre-computed random permutation
where 'd' is the node degree, in its routing table. Hence, a random route that enters through edge 'i' is designed to exit through edge x i . The message is forwarded by a suspect S in the random route until the counter reaches w (mixing time of the social network, w = O(log n)). If A → B is the final edge (tail) in that route, B will register S's public key. It sees value w and thus records K s as the tail (K a → K b ). At the same time, S will also register public key of K s as its tail. Then, we invoke protocol for the second time but in reverse, i.e., ''reversed'' routing table so that K a and K b propagate back to suspect S. we pick a value 'r' such that r should be θ ( √ m). Every suspect registers its public key in 'r' different routes, i.e., in the end, we have 'r' nodes having S's public key. Similarly, all the verifier nodes 'V' will perform 'r' random routes to verify whether to accept 'S' as a suspect. For this, S must satisfy both intersection condition and balance condition. The intersection condition states that the tails of S and V must intersect. The balance condition indicates that the verifier node 'V' should maintain 'r' counters that correspond to 'r' tails.
• SybilInfer This approach is proposed in [15] and is used to label the nodes into honest nodes and Sybil nodes. It assumes that the network is controlled by an adversary. The entire approach is based on the following assumptions: -At least one honest node in the network is known -Social networks are fast mixing -A node knows the complete social network topology Since the social networks are known to be fast mixing, it is observed in this paper that even a small cut in the graph results to negotiate this phenomenon. This is a key observation of the paper and is the basis for sybilInfer approach, which is ''the mixing between honest nodes in the social networks is fast, while the mixing between honest nodes and dishonest nodes is slow''. Hence, the determination of the set of honest nodes is the bottleneck of the graph.
The sybilInfer approach starts off by generating a set of random walks of length l = O(log |V|). Now, a cut X ⊂ V is made such that the known set of honest nodes is a subset of X. The aim of this approach is to find the probability that the nodes in this cut are all honest, given a set of traces T, that is, P(X = Honest|T). Hence, the Bayesian theorem is applied to find this probability.
where z is the normalization constant. It is also observed in this paper that the fast mixing happens only between honest nodes. If the generated random walk consists of both honest and Sybil nodes, then the probability of the node, to be honest, is low. Finally, we calculate the probability as:
is an indicator variable taking value 1 if node i is in the honest sample X j , and value zero otherwise.
• SybilBelief This technique is proposed by [21] , where the problem of finding Sybil nodes in a graph is done in a semi-supervised fashion. In this method, we assume that the condition of a minimal amount of nodes is known to be either Sybil or benign. We use this known information to predict the status of other nodes. As an initial step, we randomly assign a value 0,1 to all the nodes in the graph. Then, a pairwise Markov Random Field is developed to determine the joint probabilities of every two nodes in the graph. Finally, with the given background knowledge of Sybil and benign nodes, we successfully find the probability of each node to be Sybil or benign based on the posterior probability.
B. INFERENCE ATTACKS
All the proposed inference attacks can be broadly classified into friend-based and behavior-based attacks. Friend-based attacks rely upon the information of neighbors of the known nodes. Once we obtain nodes that are public or inferred due to known data, we collect knowledge of all the neighbor nodes. This graph is called as ''knowledge graph''. This helps us build a partial graph or sometimes an entire graph. We also infer other data from these nodes such as shared attributes. For example, if the neighbors of a specific node mostly belongs to the same university, then we can conclude that they all went to school together with high probability. This helps us in sending messages to those users with the university domain and may probably succeed in phishing attacks. Another type of attacks is based on the behavior of the users. These attacks rely on the public attributes and users who tag these attributes to their profiles. These might include favorite places to visit, restaurants, books, people to follow, cultures and so on. For example, users who like to eat in similar restaurants, follow same people and visited same places might be originated from the same country. We can also see examples on Amazon, Netflix and other e-Commerce websites where the product recommendations are based on different users who have purchased similar products in the past.
V. MOBILE SOCIAL NETWORKS
Mobility affects any system and OSN's are no exception. With the increase in social network usage on mobile phones, the number of mobile social network users have exploded. However, this is an impact of rapid growth in the mobile phone technology, and they are no longer just used for phone calls but instead provide all kinds of functionality that a computer offers. Thanks to Web 2.0 that allowed to access content over mobile internet, there are so many mobile applications that are developed to accommodate OSNs on the smart phones. There are various social network applications, but Chen and Rahman [11] • Identity servers and anonymous Identifiers: According to [2] , we maintain an identity server that maps real locations and device info to some anonymous ID. This is a central server maintaining all such information.
• Virtual individual servers for mobile devices: According to [6] , a virtual machine is installed in a user's mobile, and it runs on each one's mobile. This machine allows the user's to control what they want to share and with who they want to share. This gives the users complete access to the privacy. These mobile applications include videos and photos that result in consuming a lot of battery power.
• Re-socializing social networks: there are two types in this method [17] . 1) Out-of-Band Invitation: Here, two users agree on a pre-shared password that is exchanged via email. This password is used for all their future communication. 2) Coupling: Here, a node 'A' is coupled with two other nodes, say 'B' and 'C'. 'A' becomes the leader of the group and maintains all the information about 'B' and 'C'.
VI. ALTERNATE SYSTEMS A. SPROUT
Social Path ROUTing (SPROUT) is an alternate routing path proposed for communication between friends in a network [50] . It mainly concentrates on the reduction of communication cost between two active nodes in the system. In this method, the communication between nodes follow a peer-topeer network and hence there is no server. This technique adopts CHORD protocol for the communication and thus introduces a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) to store the id values of all the friends. According to SPROUT, when a user initially joins the network, it is assigned with a random network identifier that lies in the range [0,1]. As the user forms friends and the node generate neighbors, they are assigned with identifier numbers that are sequential to the user. This subsequent assignment of id values forms an id number ring. To reduce the communication delay between users, we also generate links halfway around the ring, quarter way, oneeighth way and so on. Hence the maximum communication delay between any two users in the network is O(log n). The DHT stores the hash value of the id keys of the neighbor which is on the best route to reach every user. This helps us while communicating with the online friends. The overall communication between two users 'u' and 'v' can be summarized into following steps: 1) Find a neighbor of 'u' whose id value is close to 'v' but not greater than log n. 2) If a neighbor 'n' is found, then the message is forwarded to 'n' and continue to find a neighbor of 'n' that is best reachable to 'v'. 3) If no such neighbor is found, then forward the message to the neighbor whose id value is the id value of 'n' + 1. Thus, the message goes to every node in the ring until the desired node 'v' is obtained.
B. LOCKR
Lockr is a system that can be integrated with any of the existing social networks [55] . It works well in both centralized and peer-to-peer network as the Lockr system is independent of the underlying network technology. The main aim of Lockr is to provide security to the users. It primarily concentrates on providing three security benefits: private communication between users, authenticating the users and providing right access controls. To provide these benefits, Lockr has proposes the following techniques:
1) Personal Identities and Address Books: Each user in the network maintains a public/private key pair that can be used for communication. Each user is also entitled to manage address book that contains information about friends and their public keys. 2) Social Attestation: This attestation acts like a certificate between two users confirming about the status of their friendship. It includes information about the two users, type of friendship between them, and most importantly a ''friendship key''. It is to be noted that two users can have more than one attestation/relation. For example, two people studied at the same university can now be co-workers. In this situation, we maintain two social attestations, but the attestation that has been issued for classmates has been expired. 3) Social Access Control Lists (ACLs): Every user also maintains an ACL that stores information about the content access to different friends. For example, a user can restrict certain personal information like movies he watched, places he visited from his employer.
Lockr provides the users with a complete choice of what technique to use and where to store the data. Since all the profile information is not public, it should be stored in a third-party database. Hence, the users can choose which database to use. Once the information is de-coupled from the social network, Lockr provides additional functionalities like creating the public/private key pair, ACLs and so on. Additionally, Lockr also provides mechanisms to deal with expired attestations and revoking them if necessary. If an attestation is expired, Lockr uses one-way hashing to protect them from being abused by non-authorized users.
C. PISCES
Pisces is a system that has also been proposed for secure communication in the online social network [41] . It is a peerto-peer network that uses onion routing for anonymous communication. Every node in the Pisces architecture generates a public/private key pair. They discover peers by using random walks. One of the major drawbacks of this technique is that it is vulnerable to route capture attacks. To address this issue, Pisces proposes ''Reciprocal Neighbor Policy''. According to this policy, we associate the routing table of each node with its neighbors. For example, if a Sybil node advertises itself as an honest node, then all of its neighboring benign nodes excludes the Sybil node from their routing tables. To ensure the security of the proposed policy, there is a periodic check on every node's neighborhood list. Four other features are associated with this policy. 1) Liveness Check: Every node checks with its benign neighbor nodes if they are alive are reciprocating the trust. 2) Degree Exchange: Every node should broadcast the degree, the number of nodes in the neighborhood list, periodically to all the neighbors. 3) Final List: Upon receiving the degree information, each node finalizes its neighborhood list and encrypts with its private key. 4) Local Integrity Check: Every node in the network saves the signed versions of the neighborhood lists from all the neighboring nodes.
D. SAFEBOOK
Safebook is a distributed on-line social network which is intended to preserve the privacy based on real-life trust [10] . It is a de-centralized OSN (DOSN) developed to issue the problems of privacy, integrity, and availability. Safebook is a three-tier architecture. Every user in Safebook is considered as a host node and connected to all the peers through the P2P overlay. There are two types of overlays:
• a set of matryoshkas which are the structures in network level that provides communication privacy.
• P2P substrate giving lookup services. Matryoshkas are designed to provide a trusted data storage and retrieval. It also uses indirection technique to communicate anonymously. The set of nodes in Matryoshkas are arranged in concentric rings, and all messages have to relay through all the rings. Since the immediate rings in the concentric circles are based on actual trust between the nodes, we assume that the information passage is secure and private.
The innermost ring consists of various nodes that are in direct communication with the core. These nodes store all of the core's data in encrypted form and are mirrored among all the nodes. In contrast to the inner most ring, the outer most ring acts as a gateway to the core. The second overlay which is P2P is mainly used to provide location service for outside nodes to find entry point of a user's matryoshkas. We also have a trusted identification server (TIS) that maintains a relation to node identifier and its pseudonym.
E. SUPERNOVA
Another DOSN that was proposed to solve the issue of privacy and autonomy was proposed in [51] , called ''Supernova''. It is a super-peer based architecture where incentives are provided to peers to help facilitate new node joins in the system. In this architecture, we save a node's data at multiple nodes which are either friends or strangers suggested by super-peers. We have three types of nodes in this architecture: user profiles, friendslist, storekeeper, and super-peers. Storekeepers of user 'n' are a list of nodes which have agreed to store the data of a user 'n' just to replicate the information. Super-peer is a special status that is given to any node if they provide their services to the system. These services include agreeing to store information of a new node who initially do not have many friends, maintain and manage various services.
When we add a new node to the network, it has to go through several phases. The initial phase is when a user joins and store all his information. He will be informed of the amount of space given to him, how long he can save the information, what kind of data can be saved and what kind of advertisements will be given to him. Once he agrees to all the terms and selects his super-peer, he enters into next phase called ''Take care phase''. In this phase, the user tries to establish friendship in the system. Super-peer will keep track of new nodes up-down time and ask other stranger nodes to replicate the user data. Once this is finished, the user enters the final stage called ''Settled phase'' where he is settled and no longer require a super-peer. Every update or change he does will be updated to all the storekeepers who are available at that time. If they are not available, they will be updated once they become available.
VII. DATABASES/DATA COLLECTION
Various datasets or databases are available online and can be used in multiple research areas. Here, we discuss some of the most known databases that can be used in the social network privacy research. One of the most extensive databases generated is the Hep-Th database that derives information from arXiv archive and the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center SPIRES-HEP database. This is a dataset of research papers and their authors. All articles are from the high-energy physics domain. This dataset is initially generated for the 2003 KDD Cup competition. There are over 42,000 objects and 500,000 links in this dataset. Objects represent authors and papers, whereas links represent the author-author relationship, author-paper relationship, and paper-paper relationship. There are also attributes associated with authors as well as links such as title, journal, author email addresses, domain information and dates related to the paper publications. This dataset contains 39 author attributes and 15 link attributes.
Another vast dataset is the Enron dataset which includes an enormous number of emails within the Enron corporation. It is made public by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission during its investigation of the company. CALO Project (A Cognitive Assistant that Learns and Organizes) later collected the data and formed into a useful database [32] . This dataset consists of 150 users who are arranged according to the hierarchy of their positions in the company. It also includes 0.5M emails. This dataset was used in social network analysis in the paper [70] to find useful mappings between authors and recipients.
Net-trace and Net-common are another common network datasets. The net-trace dataset was initially developed by tracing an IP-level network at a major university [8] . The trace monitors traffic at the gateway, so it produces a bi-partite graph between IP addresses internal to the institution, and external IP addresses.
The Net-common dataset was derived from the Net-trace. There are 201 internal IP addresses, and links between addresses exist only if there is a communication between internal and external address. This graph is very dense. Both net-trace and net-common datasets have been used in [24] to identify vertices based on refinement and subgraph exploration queries. The refinement queries are knowledge queries where we know partial information about nodes. Subgraph exploration is to explore the local graph around an identified individual.
Club Nexus is another social networking website that was developed and used at Standford University [5] . This dataset consists of 2200 nodes and an average of eight friends/links to each node. This dataset is used in [49] to analyze the alternate social networking system called ''SPROUT''. In this paper, authors analyze the algorithm proposed for the problem of misrouting.
Two authors have collected Facebook data for their work. These datasets include a Facebook friendship graph from the New Orleans local network [57] , a Facebook interaction graph and a Facebook friendship graph from a moderate-sized regional network [59] .
Another dataset was collected by [29] for her visualization application. Authors have created a web crawler that has crawled over 1.5 million online profiles on Friendster. All the data was collected from October 2003 to February 2004. The crawler obtains the information of a node along with all its links to other nodes in a breadth-first search manner. Overview of all the real datasets is summarized in Table 1 .
In addition to the above mentioned real-time datasets, there are also synthetic data generators that are available online. These generators generate data when we run the code. This is not real time, but the code can be modified to suit our needs. These generators are studied in detail in [39] . Several existing algorithms produce various synthetic data. One of the famous algorithms is the Small World Topology algorithm [74] . This algorithm preserves the properties of a random graph while retaining the high-level structure of an online social network [44] , [58] .
Another synthetic data developed by [1] . This paper talks about a social graph with power law distribution. They have collected data from an enormous number of long distance phone calls. All the callers and the called are considered as nodes while a call between two nodes is a link in the graph. Since the calls have direction, links in the graph are also directional. Therefore, each node consists of inbound degree which is the number of incoming calls to the node. Similarly, each node has an outbound degree that counts the number of outgoing calls from the node.
Additionally, online data visualization tools are available to comprehend social network graphs. One of the tools is developed by Heer in 2004 [30] . This is a visualization tool for online social networking. This tool collects the online profile information every 20ms. It also provides tools to zoom in, zoom out, drag and drop nodes/links and so on. Another visualization toolkit that is available is the Prefuse visualization toolkit [73] . Prefuse is designed for high-level visualization techniques. It gives the users an option to store their data in database tables or graphs or trees. It also supports dynamic queries and database connectivity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a survey of research on wide range of privacy-enhancing methods in social networks. We have surveyed on various articles referring social network as graph data. The privacy-preserving techniques that are discussed in this survey paper can broadly be categorized into two types: edge and vertex privacy methods.Various authors have studied them and proposed solutions accordingly. Each solution has advantages and disadvantages. To summarize all the methods, we need to address four critical issues while developing a new anonymization mechanism.
• Understand the properties of the network • Understand the data types in the database • Knowledge of the adversary • Utility of the data VOLUME 6, 2018 Edge and vertex privacy preserving approaches vary widely and have been explored in detail. Attacks on the edges or vertices also vary widely from local to global data extraction. A simple approach to preserve privacy is obtained through random perturbation which is usually simple and lesser complexity methods. Due to this, they can deal with large networks. Additionally, methods based on random perturbation can be designed to work with streaming or big data specifically. But these methods do not ensure privacy and also it is difficult to de-anonymize the network. Recent developments in this method were given by [4] , [24] , and [63] which includes random sparsification.
We have also studied various alternate social network proposals that intend to change the structure of existing social networks to provide better privacy. SPROUT, Lockr, and PISCES are such networks. They are all de-centralized systems that are designed for a specific purpose. Pisces is the first decentralized design which is developed to address the scalability issues in social networks as well as to mitigate route capture attacks. Although this system provides user privacy, it fails to address the problem of link privacy. Lockr is an access control system using social networking abstractions. Lockr can also be used when the permission from individual websites are not provided and thus ensuring the private content sharing through Lockr access control.
Apart from privacy-preserving methods and alternate systems, we have also provided suitable datasets and their functionality that can be used by future researchers. We have also provided on how to generate synthetic data using existing data generators. However, these datasets assume that the social networks are graph networks and hence all the datasets provided are graph datasets.
IX. FUTURE WORK
Research into the privacy violations in social networks is still in its infancy. Although there were so many methods and algorithms proposed to avoid these privacy violations, they have failed to concentrate on all t known facts. In this paper, we try to provide insight on all such known methods. The basic assumption in these methods is that the network is a graph with nodes and links. So, the privacy-preserving mechanisms developed were developed around this concept. However, keeping the recent trends in mind, social networking is evolving at an exponential rate. Links between nodes have varied over time in many ways: ''friends in Facebook'', ''Like / follow a page'', ''retweeting strangers tweets'',''follow / follow back a celebrity'', ''tagging places / people in Instagram'' and so on. This led to the changing definition of the link between two users. Also, nodes are no longer just people; they are places, buildings, and pages. With this ever evolving social networks, a simple node/link privacy preserving might not be sufficient. Additionally, it is also crucial to understand the needs of different social networking sites and address them accordingly.
Also, different social networks vary regarding connecting to other people. A graph considered should be a directional graph rather than undirectional or bidirectional graphs. For example, an edge in the graph could be an email conversation between two nodes or a user subscription to a blog. Most of the research assumes the graphs to be non-directional and it doesn't correctly represent the true nature of the social network. Also, some of the proposed anonymization problems are NP and NP-hard. Hence, they did not achieve an optimal solution. It is to be noted that the increase in dataset size increases the computational complexity of the algorithm.
Considerable research was done on how to handle the privacy of a graph based social network. However, very few have considered the meta data information of an individual (vertex). This, however, leads to various other problems. Integrating the attribute information to vertex raises another problem called ''attribute anonymization''. Most of the anonymization methods combine users and attributes into a single class called ''nodes''. This leaves the interactions between users and attributes un-anonymized. Since most of the attributes are public, it is easy to de-anonymize them and then link them with certain users.
Big data anonymization is a serious issue as the data tends to vary in multiple ways. The following aspects of anonymization are distinct to big data and need to be analyzed ( [14] ):
• Address the issues of controlled linkability, as big data deals with linking data from several anonymized sources. However, this should not affect the reidentification and attribute disclosure properties from the original privacy-preserving methods.
• Since big data is composed of various data sources, privacy on the entire dataset should hold as well as on the smaller datasets.
• Anonymization should also be provided for the continuous data streams like sensor readings.
• computational efficiency for privacy-preserving algorithms should not be too large that it affects the real-time usage.
• In case of a decentralized network, data should be anonymized at each individual's device before sending on to the network.
